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Individuals with profound amnesia are markedly impaired in explicitly recalling new
episodic events, but appear to preserve the capacity to use information from other
sources. Amongst these preserved capacities is the ability to form new memories of
an emotional nature – a skill at the heart of developing and sustaining interpersonal
relationships. The psychoanalytic study of individuals with profound amnesia might
contribute to the understanding the importance of each memory system, including
effects on key analytic processes such as transference and countertransference.
However, psychoanalytic work in the presence of profound amnesia might also require
important technical modifications. In the first report of its kind, we describe observations
from a long term psychoanalytic process (72 sessions) with an individual (JL) who
has profound amnesia after an anoxic episode. The nature of therapy was shaped
by JL’s impairment in connecting elements that belong to distant (and even relatively
close) moments in the therapeutic process. However, we were also able to document
areas of preservation, in what appears to be a functioning therapeutic alliance. As
regards transference, the relationship between JL and his analyst can be viewed as
the evolution of a narcissistic transference, and case material is provided that maps
this into three phases: (i) rejecting; (ii) starting to take in; and (iii) full use of the analytic
space – where each phase exhibits differing degrees of permeability between JL and
the analyst. This investigation appears to have important theoretical implications for
psychoanalytic practice, and for psychotherapy in general – and not only with regard
to brain injured populations. We especially note that it raises questions concerning
the mechanism of therapeutic action in psychoanalysis and psychotherapy, and the
apparent unimportance of episodic memory for many elements of therapeutic change.
Keywords: amnesia, brain injury, emotion, memory, psychoanalysis, psychotherapy, transference
“Why was he doubly irritated? Because he had forgotten and because he
remembered that he had reminded himself twice not to forget”
James Joyce, Ulysses
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INTRODUCTION
Profound amnesia, after acquired brain damage, has long
offered valuable insight into the neurological basis, and the
neuropsychological mechanisms, of memory and learning
(Milner et al., 1968; Schacter, 1992; Squire and Zola, 1997).
The most important finding of this line of research has been
the recognition of multiple independent memory systems. For
example, individuals with profound amnesia –after hippocampal
damage– are markedly impaired on explicitly recalling new
episodic events, but appear to preserve the capacity to use
information from other sources, such as procedural or skills-
based memory, and critically when this information is of an
emotional nature. Thus, clinical reports and behavioral studies
suggest that individuals with profound amnesia are not only able
to experience emotions (Feinstein et al., 2010; Damasio et al.,
2012), but more importantly, can learn about the emotional
valence of experiences and make decisions based upon that
knowledge (Claparede, 1911/1951; Tranel and Damasio, 1990,
1993; Turnbull and Evans, 2006; Evans-Roberts and Turnbull,
2011). This preserved capacity is at the heart of developing and
sustaining interpersonal relationships.
The existence of such separate memory systems is a topic
that has increasingly attracted the interest of the psychoanalytic
community. The main reason appears to be that such findings
converge with recent psychoanalytic theorization regarding the
role of explicit and implicit domains for psychic change (Clyman,
1991; Charles, 2005; Fosshage, 2005; Boston Change Process
Study Group, 2008). In this context, the psychoanalytic study
of individuals with profound amnesia might contribute to the
understanding of the importance of each memory system, and its
relevance for key psychoanalytic processes, such as transference
and countertransference. To our knowledge, there is only one
case report that has partially addressed this issue. Turnbull et al.
(2006) described a psychoanalytic treatment (eight sessions) of an
individual (Mr. N) who became deeply amnesic after an anoxic
episode. The main goal of that case study was to explore whether
Mr. N was able to learn from the dynamic interaction with
the analyst, and to determine if such interaction modified the
emotion related material during the sessions, despite his absence
of episodic recall of the analyst, or even that the meetings had
taken place. The authors observed that during the treatment,
the emotional experience of Mr. N toward the analyst changed,
showing ‘greater feelings of familiarity and levels of comfort.’
They concluded that such emotional change in the interaction
may have reflected the ‘beginning of a transference relationship.’
Even though the case report of Mr. N offers valuable insight
into the preservation of interpersonal emotional learning in
amnesic patients, it nevertheless has important limitations. The
most obvious is the short duration of the treatment (which lasted
only 8 weeks) allowed only observation of the very early stages of
the transferential process, and not a more complete examination
of the transference phenomenon. Another theoretical limitation
is that it focuses on the generation, and modification, of feelings
from the patient toward the analyst (transference), not taking
into account the analyst’s emotional experience toward the
patient (countertransference). This is a limitation in two senses.
Firstly, contemporary psychoanalytic views on transference and
countertransference are regarded as two mutually influencing
aspects of the same interpersonal process (Thomä and Kächele,
2010). Secondly, by not considering the countertransferential
phenomenon, it does not take into account the impact of the
patients’ disorganized mind on the analyst’s mind, and the ways
in which the patient might use the analyst’s mind as a source
of regulation (Pepping, 1993; Lewis, 1999; Coetzer, 2006; Salas,
2008; Klonoff, 2010; Salas et al., 2013).
The main goal of this article is to contribute a unique case
to the existing literature on the neuropsychological basis of
memory systems, and its potential relevance for psychoanalytic
theory and technique. We describe observations from a long
term psychoanalytic process (72 sessions) of an individual with
profound amnesia after an anoxic episode. This case study
addresses two main questions. Firstly, what is the impact of
amnesia on transference and countertransference phenomena?
Secondly, which technical and therapeutic modifications
are required to work psychoanalytically with such amnesic
individuals?
CASE DESCRIPTION
Biographical Information
In the period of treatment, JL was a 38 years old single man.1
At the time of the brain injury, 3 years earlier, JL lived alone,
at what was once the family home. He had been educated
to Master’s degree level, and was employed as a professional.
Three years before treatment, as a result of a complex medical
condition related to diabetes, he had experienced an anoxic
brain injury, and upon admission to hospital he suffered
three cardiac arrests in quick succession. Consistent with the
common neuropsychological consequences of such damage, JL
then presented with a marked impairment in laying down new
episodic memories (anterograde amnesia), but a largely preserved
capacity to recall events prior to it (retrograde memory).
The rehabilitation service’s intake report for JL indicates that
before the accident, there were significant premorbid systemic
issues in his background. JL had two older brothers, two younger
sisters and a younger brother. His life had been fractious and
unsettled, with the family moving quite frequently for work –
often internationally. There was one long distance move, where
the family settled for approximately 10 years. On admission to
the rehabilitation services, JL reported using and abusing alcohol
from the age of thirteen. However, during treatment, he informed
the starting date as even earlier (10 years of age).
JL was 20 years old when his parents separated, acrimoniously,
and he recalls having to leave the country quickly, with his mother
and siblings relocating to their country of origin, and living
off the kindness and generosity of friends and family. JL met
this adversity quite well, working during the day as an office
clerk, and returning to education at night in order to obtain a
Masters degree. He also trained for, and eventually worked in, a
1In order to protect JL’s anonymity, names and places have been altered. Informed
consent was obtained from JL to publish anonymized findings.
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professional position. However, within a few years of returning
(when JL was in his early twenties) both parents passed away. His
father was the initial loss, followed 3 years later by his mother. JL
spiraled into a full blown alcohol and cannabis addiction, which
also led to deterioration in work performance, and subsequent
loss of a series of work positions. At the same time JL began
to neglect his personal well-being, his living arrangements, and
more importantly his diabetes, which had been diagnosed when
he was sixteen. This resulted in a series of heart attacks, and
eventually the anoxic brain injury, as a result of a complex
medical condition related to diabetes, a disorder often associated
with mismanagement of insulin.
Since the injury, JL has lived in a residential unit for
neurological patients. Prior to this he had spent a year in
a rehabilitation hospital, which he appeared to have much
preferred to the current accommodation. At the hospital his
days were structured and interesting. At the residential unit he
became the youngest service user, and did not have much in
common with the other patients. He had (and has) an older
brother who lives nearby, visiting JL once a week. However, JL
had little contact with the rest of his family, who live abroad.
At the residential unit, his routine was highly repetitive, with
much of his day consisting of listening to music, doing jigsaws,
and making models. There are further activities organized by the
residential unit, and the rehabilitation services which he attended
twice a week. Because of his diabetes he was monitored closely
by the ‘sisters’ (as JL described them), in reality nurses. This lack
of freedom was a great source of frustration, and JL expressed a
strong desire to live independently, or to be moved to assisted
housing.
Clinical Presentation
At the initial consultation JL was dressed in jeans, and wearing
a football jersey and training shoes – which were in need of
cleaning. His hair was long and greasy, and came to just above
the shoulder, around his neck hung a collection of odds and
ends, suspended from what looked like a piece of climbing rope,
attached to a large climbing clip. The objects were nail clippers,
keys, pens, a miniature torch, a bottle opener, and a mobile
phone. The latter JL used as a memory aid. He also wore glasses,
attached to a cord around his neck. He had a day’s growth of
beard, where large areas beneath the chin had been missed when
last he shaved. His fingers were nicotine stained, and the nail
on the little finger of his left hand had been allowed to grow
much longer than its neighbors. This idiosyncrasy endured for
the remainder of the therapy, a remarkably continuous feature
despite JL’s amnesia.
Upon meeting JL for the first time, he presented as polite
and friendly, and spoke both confidently and clearly, with a
foreign accent. He appeared to be lucid and oriented for both
time and space. When entering the consulting room he examined
it with what seemed like an intelligent curiosity. However, after
exchanging introductions, the amnesia presented itself almost
immediately, with JL repeating information to the analyst within
5 min. The following vignette shows the impact of JL’s memory
impairment in the continuity of the session, as well as the
preservation of other abilities, such as his insight:
P (Paul Moore): Maybe I’ll take some notes while we’re
talking. . . maybe just start by just telling me about yourself.
J (JL): I was born in_____. . . left for ______ in 1981 till 1994
returned to Ireland and went to (University) at night time. I
worked full time and studied part-time. I did that for 6 years. . .
got my degree . . .. . .. and worked in the profession and after
that it was a bit of mystery for me.
P: What do you remember?
J: How do you mean?
P: What happened to you?
J: What happened me? I don’t know.
P: What do you remember of your early life?
J: Oh yeah, I remember being brought up I remember
everything up to about 2 years ago. . .3 years ago (Suddenly the
alarm goes off somewhere in the room and we both cannot find
the source for a while, and analyst and patient share laughter).
P: So you don’t remember anything after 3 years ago?
J: No
P: So what happened?
J: I have no idea.
P: And would you like to tell me about your life before 3 years
ago?
J: I used to be a (professional position). . .. (i.e., JL had already
forgotten that he mentioned his work.)
J: I can’t read. . . I can’t get the information to stay in my head.
And I don’t know why I could read and read and read and read
and I would have to go back and start again. . . just have to keep
repeating it over and over and it just won’t stay in my head (He
seemed to be aware of his memory problems, but it did puzzle
him why this was so).
P: And what about listening to audio tapes, watching TV?
J: I can watch TV, but ask me about half an hour of watching
and I haven’t got a clue about what I’ve been watching so (JL
did not appear to be unduly upset about this).
P: You can’t hold the information?
J: Yeah
P: It gets dropped.
J: Mmm mmm it goes in one ear and out the other
P: What is that like for you?
J: It doesn’t bother me at all. . . if there is a film on I will watch
it and I will really enjoy it but don’t ask me about the film a half
an hour after I was watching it. I wouldn’t even know if I was
watching it or not.
JL’s clinical presentation during the following sessions offers
additional information regarding the extent of his amnesia. When
collected from the reception area, JL appeared not to remember
the analyst’s name, the location of the consulting room where they
have met the week before, nor the layout of the building. During
the initial sessions he did not formulate questions regarding why
he was meeting with the analyst, nor who the analyst was. Neither
were there ever any explicit references to the previous session,
suggesting some level of temporal discontinuity. Nevertheless,
JL could bring back topics that had been discussed during the
previous meeting, most notably sports, which seemed to have
been ‘preserved’ somehow in memory. Interestingly, even though
this topic was similar, the emphasis put by JL was different on
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 August 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 1418
fpsyg-08-01418 August 25, 2017 Time: 18:18 # 4
Moore et al. Amnesia and Psychoanalysis
each occasion. The repetition of certain topics across sessions was
a cardinal feature of the therapeutic process:
J: Did you watch any sport over the weekend? (This was a topic
discussed during the previous session.)
P: I didn’t. . .Did you?
J: No, not really. I did watch Rory McIlroy though.
P: Do you like golf?
J: Yes, I used to play it. . .but I was never really any good at it.
That’s going back a couple of years now.
P: Did you enjoy it?
J: Oh yeah
P: How are things in Bellevue (his residential unit, not
the actual name. Name is intentionally changed to protect
anonymity)?
J: Same old same old. . . ticking along. . . (2 min silence) . . . Did
you watch any of the golf just on there now?
P: No, I didn’t see any of it.
J: Rory McIlroy did very well. I don’t know what happened to
Tiger Woods. He’s gone off the radar completely.
Neuropsychological Presentation
JL’s premorbid level of general intellectual functioning was
estimated to have fallen within the average range (WTAR,
Wechsler, 2001). In contrast, his post-injury general intellectual
functioning appeared within the low average range (Total
IQ = 89, WAIS-III, Wechsler, 1998). There was no observable
discrepancy between verbal and visual abilities (Verbal IQ = 88,
Performance IQ = 87) and a normal performance on Verbal
Comprehension, Perceptual Organization, and Working
Memory Indexes from the WAIS-III. Only Processing Speed
appeared below the normal range according to age and
educational level (scaled score= 6).
Memory assessment confirmed the clinical presentation of
profound anterograde amnesia, characterized by a marked
impairment in encoding and recalling verbal and visual
information after a delayed period of time. In the Logic
Memory Task (WMS-III, Wechsler, 1997) immediate recall was
moderately impaired (scaled score = 6) while delayed recall
was severely impaired (scaled score = 1). A similar picture was
observed in the deficit recalling information, both immediately
(5/50 units) and after a delayed period of minutes (3/50 units). In
the Rey–Osterrieth Complex Figure (Osterrieth and Rey, 1944),
JL only managed to recall five elements in the delayed condition,
thus suggesting a similar profile to the one observed in the Logic
Memory Task. It is important to note that JL did not improve
significantly his performance when cues were provided in the
Logic Memory Recognition task (18/50), thus suggesting that his
memory impairment was a consequence of a deficit in encoding
(taking in) and consolidating (learning) new information and not
retrieving -as is commonly observed in patients with dysexecutive
syndromes after frontal lobe damage. JL’s adequate performance
on executive tasks that assess working memory (Spatial Span
WAIS scaled score = 12; Digit Span WAIS scaled score = 8)
as well as planning, reasoning, and problem solving (Twenty
Question Task scaled score = 10, D-KEFS, Delis et al., 2001)
supports this conclusion. This ‘hippocampal’ profile of memory
impairment was consistent with JL’s preserved ability to focus
his attention and hold onto information for seconds, on its
immediate presentation. However, JL’s difficulty encoding new
information meant that any distraction during the task resulted
in a failure to retrieve information after the interference.
PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PROCESS
The psychotherapeutic intervention consisted of seventy-two,
once-weekly, face-to-face, 50-min sessions of psychoanalytic
psychotherapy. The therapy took place in a consulting room in
a busy brain injury rehabilitation day service center. The room
was used for neuropsychological and psychological consulting
and was allocated to JL’s therapy for the same 1 h every
week. The psychotherapeutic work was conducted by the lead
author of this paper (PM), who is an experienced Psychoanalytic
Psychotherapist.
The treatment was defined as a psychoanalytic psychotherapy
since the intervention was informed by psychoanalytic theory
and technique but did not take the same intensive form as
psychoanalysis. We followed here the work of authors like
Bateman and Holmes (1995); Etchegoyen (2005), who propose
that any intervention that undertakes to first understand a
situation by applying psychoanalytic principles, and to then
formulate an intervention based on such understanding in a
clinical context, is a form of psychoanalytic practice.
Case Formulation
JL’s case is complex, since there are several factors that interact in
his clinical presentation, particularly in the process of emotional
adjustment to his brain injury. As described above, he presents
with a profile of severe episodic amnesia, although other
important cognitive abilities – such as executive functions –
appear to be relatively spared. As can be observed from the
vignettes presented, JL exhibits a clear awareness of his inability to
perform certain mental operations (‘I can’t get information to stay
in my head’), but he is apparently unable to link such problems
with his brain injury, or to his amnesic syndrome (‘I don’t know
why’). In addition, his emotional response to this situation is
peculiar in that he is apparently indifferent to the existence of
such deficits (‘It doesn’t bother me at all’). This neutral evaluation
of his emotional deficits, technically labeled anosodiaphoria, has
been frequently described in patients with episodic amnesia (for
a review, see Tate, 2002).
This lack of concern about his deficits, and the impact
they have on everyday life, is related to the paucity of JL’s
explicit complaints. In fact, during the first sessions, the only
preoccupation expressed by JL to the analyst is that he was
not able to live independently. However, this only appeared
sporadically, and JL did not seem proactive in continuing the
discussion of this topic with the analyst throughout the sessions,
nor finding help in understanding and solving this problem. On
a more implicit level, this complaint appeared to be linked to
his interpersonal difficulties with the staff of the residential unit.
Thus, JL reported that he felt that all of his movements were
monitored by the nurses – or the ‘sisters,’ as in ‘nursing sisters.’
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Interestingly, his favorite films were Escape From Alcatraz, The
Great Escape, and Return to Alcatraz.
P: It’s very difficult for you not having the freedom.
J: Not being able to do what I want to do when I want to do it,
it can really get on my nerves sometimes, uh huh even just to
walk to the shop or do something like that I can’t even just to
go for a walk.
P: You can’t go for a walk on your own?
J: No . . . that really pisses me off.
P: There is a huge sense of loss around your freedom?
J. Oh there is yeah I don’t have any freedom now. Even when
I was in (inpatient unit), I could go for a walk around the
hospital. . . at least get some exercise.
P: And that can’t happen in here?
J: No they won’t even let me outside the front door without
wondering where I’m going, who I’m going with and how will
I get back . . .That’s the real big thing that gets to me at the
moment.
Another source of conflict with the staff was the
administration of his daily insulin dose. The ideal situation
would be for JL to have his morning insulin roughly 10 min prior
to breakfast. This would stabilize his blood sugars for the day.
However, the timing of the insulin varied according to which
members of staff were working. In consequence, more often than
not, breakfast arrived first, and then JL refused to eat it, as this
meant his sugars fluctuated throughout the day. This situation
regularly brought JL into conflict with the ‘sisters,’ and this
conflict, on occasion, could become quite heated and animated.
From a psychoanalytic perspective, the interpersonal conflicts
presented by JL are clearly grounded in a present reality but
may also be related to his early history of neglect, and to the
personality traits that were defensively crystallized as a way of
coping with such a neglectful environment. This is perhaps
observed in the split relationship that JL establishes with the
‘sisters.’ In some situations, for example when the insulin is
not provided on the right time, the nurses are experienced as
neglectful and useless, and JL reacts to this with anger and
frustration. In other moments, when the sisters are monitoring
his behavior in order to keep him safe, he experiences them
as controlling, and positions himself as someone self-sufficient
that does not need any help. Apparently, there is here an
interaction between the lack of awareness regarding his deficits
with the exacerbation of a narcissistic pattern of defense. On
this argument, his brain injury has disrupted his capacity to
be autonomous, and he is now forced into depending on
others, a position that has been rather traumatic in the past.
In consequence, the ability to ask for help and accept help,
something necessary in adjusting and coming to terms with brain
injury, is seriously compromised.
Psychotherapeutic Process and
Transference
There is a small literature describing transference phenomena
after brain damage (Goldstein, 1954; Pepping, 1993; Lewis,
1999; Kaplan-Solms and Solms, 2000; Coetzer, 2006; Salas, 2008;
Yeates, 2009; Klonoff, 2010; Salas et al., 2013; Tiberg, 2014).
However, case reports describing how this process unfolds when
working with amnesic patients are few in number. In the only
paper addressing this topic, Turnbull et al. (2006) suggested
that profound amnesia did not compromise the generation of
feelings toward the analyst. The case of JL is remarkable in that
it offers, for the first time, supporting evidence not only to the
fact that episodic amnesia spares individuals’ capacity to generate
transferential feelings, but also their capacity to modify them
through the use of analytic tools, in an apparently long term set
of changes.
The transferential process between JL and his analyst might be
considered as the evolution of a narcissistic transference. It can be
roughly mapped into three phases (characterized below through
specific moments) each of them exhibiting different degrees of
permeability between JL and the analyst. These moments reflect
different ‘scenifications’ in which JL and the analyst adopted
distinctive positions, particularly in relation to core conflicts
associated with depending on others and accepting the new
vulnerable aspects of the Self after his brain injury.
Rejecting: The Liffey Bridge Incident
The first moment where strong transferential feelings emerged
was early during treatment (session 6). JL’s usual routine
was to arrive very early for therapy, often before the
analyst. Notwithstanding his considerable memory impairments,
sometimes JL took a walk alone from the consulting room
premises, down to the quays of the river Liffey, and back up
again. It was a relatively short walk, on the same street, with no
turns or major junctions, a walk which took roughly 10 min. One
day, JL asked the analyst what he thought of “the little pedestrian
bridge over the river Liffey.” This question evoked confusion in
the analyst, who knew the nearest pedestrian bridge was at least
four or five blocks down the river, and thought that it was unlikely
that JL could have walked that far and made his way back in
10 min. The analyst cautiously challenged JL’s assertion that this
was a pedestrian bridge, and commented that he (the analyst)
had in fact driven over the bridge on his way to the session.
The session then took a difficult turn, since JL started holding
firmly to his belief that this was a pedestrian bridge. The analyst
later commented in his notes about this moment: “There was a
clear sense that he was clinging on to this understanding and any
attempt to question it elicited a strongly defensive response.” JL
reacted as if the analyst was himself delusional, and said: “You
couldn’t have, there is no way you could fit a car on that bridge,
it’s just not big enough.” JL’s response evoked a sense of doubt in
the analyst, who wondered whether there was another pedestrian
bridge nearby which he had simply forgotten about. After the
session, the analyst commented on this episode: “I momentarily
started wondering whether this was another manifestation of the
amnesic countertransference, where I simply start to forget things
just like JL.” He also resolved to investigate this further on the
way home. However, as was often the case with thoughts around
JL, this resolution slipped from the analyst’s mind soon afterward.
The interaction between JL and the analyst can be summarized
in the following main elements. Firstly, there is a disagreement
between JL and the analyst. Secondly, the analyst’s questioning
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triggers a moment of emotion dysregulation in JL, which is
followed by a defensive scenification: the analyst is stupidly
wrong (‘you cannot fit a car on that bridge’), foolish and deluded.
JL, on the contrary, is right and clever, and there is nothing
possibly at fault with his mind. Thirdly, such scenification
generates particular feelings in the analyst; he feels confusion,
uncertainty, and starts wondering whether his mind is working
appropriately or not. The analyst now feels foolish and deluded.
Theoretically speaking, it is possible to understand this
episode as the defensive scenification, of a highly fixed narcissistic
structure, which facilitates the regulation of negative feelings
that emerge when acquiring some traumatic awareness about
presence of severe cognitive problems. On this account, JL is
not permeable to the influence of the analyst (i.e., the analyst’s
alternative view of reality), and information cannot flow between
them, and perceptions cannot be modified. In consequence,
interpretations are experienced as frightening and threatening,
with JL investing large amounts of energy in preserving his model
of the world.
Defensive reactions like this have been described before in
patients with brain injury, and are often referred to as narcissistic
rage. According to Klonoff and Lage (1991) the rage is an external
representation of the internal shame experienced as a result of
narcissistic injury. To Kohut (1972), rage and shame are the
two principal experiential and behavioral manifestation of a
disturbed narcissistic equilibrium. Narcissistic rage would refer to
aggressive responses that aim to destroy the offending self-object,
when this self-object is experienced as threatening the continued
cohesion or existence of the Self (Wolf, 1988). Shame, on the
other side, arises when the ego is unable to provide a proper
discharge for the exhibicionistic demands of the narcissistic self
or when the self-objects do not respond with expected mirroring
(Kohut, 1971). In this case, the analyst’s offense is to point to JL’s
mistake, an action that JL perceives as an attack to the fragile
integrity of his mind. An interesting element of this case, which
is novel in understanding the phenomenon of narcissistic rage, is
the projection of parts of the Self to the analyst. In this case, it
is the analyst who experiences confusion, uncertainty, and also
doubts about the proper working of his own mind. And it is also
the analyst who experiences a decrease in self-esteem, by feeling
foolish and stupid (shame!). One conclusion might be that by
considering the impact that narcissistic rage has into the analyst,
a more relational paradigm can be constructed, where elements
of the Self that cannot be thought by the patient can then be
contained and metabolized by the analyst.
The incident of the bridges over the river Liffey was a
cornerstone of the therapeutic process, in that it allowed the
analyst direct access to JL’s experience of fragmentation, when in
touch with his amnesic mind. It also contributed to understand
the nature of the defensive mechanisms that he deployed when
attempting to regulate such states. The narcissistic nature of his
defenses also illuminated interpersonal conflicts that occurred
outside therapy, which might be linked to his history of family
abandonment. For example, JL’s interpersonal difficulties at the
center were marked by the belief that he did not need care from
the sisters, for he did not need any help after his brain injury. He
felt that he could manage by himself. However, when depending
on others was out of his reach (for example the daily insulin
injection), their failure in providing exactly what he expected
triggered intense reactions of frustration and rage.
This incident is also relevant for a more theoretical reason.
After the episode, JL spontaneously brought the “bridge” incident
into four consecutive sessions, something rarely seen during the
whole treatment. He often began the sessions by asking the
analyst “Well, did you get a chance to check out that bridge?” This
phenomenon is particularly interesting in that it offers evidence
to support the claim that patients with deep episodic amnesia
can encode and retrieve new memories. Furthermore, it also
suggests that the emotional nature of the event might be key
in the registration of this new information, and that intense
emotional events appear to enhance the often compromised
temporal continuity in deeply amnesic patients, presumably
through rehearsal. Notably, in a life of daily failure, the bridge
incident is (from JL’s perspective) a personal triumph – a
moment when he is more knowledgeable than the analyst. The
analyst wrote in his notes about this particular event providing
a temporal formulation: “there is a strong desire for JL to
make sense of this puzzling experience, and to use the therapy,
and my mind, to make sense of what happened.” Considering
the previously described defensive scenification, this repetition
appeared to open the possibility of a new form of relationship.
By using the mind of the analyst to make sense, JL was beginning
to accept placing himself in a position of necessity, and also to
tolerate the fact that he might not be able to solve the puzzle on
his own. A new interpersonal configuration, based on care and
collaboration, then began to emerge, modifying the previously
installed ‘clever-stupid’ script.
Starting to Take in: “I Know What You Are Saying,
But. . .”
A second phase of the transference was characterized by a
progressive loosening of JL’s narcissistic structure, with a higher
degree of permeability to the analyst’s interventions. JL was
able to use the analyst more consistently, in order to explore
the impact that his mental dynamics had on the way he
approached problems in the outside world. However, even
though information was exchanged more easily between JL and
his analyst, and JL was more prepared to consider the analyst’s
point of view, there was still resistance to take his suggestions in,
or use them in order to modify his internal working models. The
following extract, which belongs to a session from the middle part
of the therapy (session number 39), illustrates these dynamics and
possibly also symbolizes JL’s post-brain injury mind: an apparatus
that seems to work perfectly (the TV) but is unable to access areas
of the mind that store and process pre-recorded experience (the
DVD player).
J: Yeah. . . (silence 6 min). . . they got us new TVs there last
week, last Wednesday. I got my new TV, the thing is not worth
a bollocks. I just want my old one back now. . . my old TV,
I could hook my DVD player in and watch DVDs on it and
everything, the new TV I can’t.
P: Why not?
J: I don’t know why. . . it won’t recognize the TV is there.
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P: You’ve got the right leads and everything for it?
J: Oh yeah it’s actually the same connections go from this TV
into the old TV. Everything is exactly the same.
P: That’s very strange.
J: It just comes up as though it isn’t registering it.
P: And is there anybody there that can have a look at it for you?
J: I’ll have to get maintenance down. . . but I can’t see what they
can do that I can’t do. You see what I mean?
P: Mmm
J: ‘Cos everything is exactly the same, same connections, same
wires, same ports, everything . . . click it all on, all good, click
favorites and nothing comes on.
P: You’ve tried turning it on and turning it off, all that kind of
stuff?
J: Yeah
P: It’s very frustrating.
J: Mmm mmm . . .. Bring me back me old television and I’ll be
happy.
P: Can you do that? Is it around?
J: I don’t know.
P: There’s nothing wrong with it by the sounds of it.
J: It was perfect.
P: What’s different about this new one? Why was it replaced?
J: I don’t know, no idea.
P: So something that worked perfectly well has been replaced
or changed.
J: With a broken one.
P: With something that is broken.
J: Yeah
P: And you have no choice in the matter.
J: No
P: There is something that is not compatible, something is not
working and you don’t know what it is.
J: I don’t know what is wrong with this one.
P: Internally?
J: Yeah. Because the remote control is exactly the same.
Everything is exactly the same. It just won’t register that the
DVD player is there. . .. I don’t think it is the DVD player,
because the DVD player still works on the big screen on the
TV inside.
P: It might be a flaw in the TV?
J: It must be it must be something wrong with the TV. How
would you break a TV, but not break it so it looked like you
broke it?
P: Laughs
J: Laughs. . . And get the old one back. . .that’s what I was
thinking of last night. How am I going to wreck this TV, the
new TV?
P: But is it not broken already? If it’s not picking up your DVD
player, it’s not working.
J: Yes. There’s probably something wrong with it I can get all
the channels, I can watch TV on it. But I don’t want to go to
N and say I want a new TV, because this one is not working
properly. She’ll be like “what’s wrong with it?”
P: Have you told her about the TV?
J: No
P: Why not? What stops you?
J: What am I going to get out of her?
P: She might help, she might be able to fix it?
J: No, I couldn’t see that happening.
P: Or have it arranged to have it looked at by somebody who
might fix it. . . you rule out that possibility?
J: Yeah. Because it is not broken as such, you know, that sort of
way.
P: It’s hard for you to ask for help?
J: Who, N?
P: Mmmm
J: Ah, yeah
P: You might explain to her that you’ve tried and ask her would
it be possible to get someone to look at it. She might be able to
arrange that?
J: I suppose that is one way of going about it.
P: It is hard for you to even entertain that possibility? It’s kicked
to touch straight away.
J: Well in a way it is, because going to N and telling her that
the DVD player is not working on my TV. She would be like
so what! What do you want me to do about it?
P: And how do you know that?
J: Because that is N. That is what she is like. . . I’ve been through
that with her I know exactly what she is going to say.
P: Can you think of a way of saying it. . . ?
J: I’ve been wrecking me head trying to bring it up with her, like
I can’t watch my DVDs now because the DVD is not working
or it isn’t compatible or what ever.
P: I’m just thinking about the way you are thinking about it.
You are being confrontational with her.
J: Yeah
P: You want to confront her about it, about why the TV is not
working?
J: Mmm mmm.
P: Where a better approach might be to ask her for help. . . You
know, “Would you mind having a look at it for me?”
J: What is she going to say? I don’t know anything about it!
P: I think if you bring it to her, in a way, where you accuse
her. . .
J: In a way that she is involved.
P: Or giving out about wanting your old TV back?
J: I know what you are saying.
P: Immediately it is going to have a defensive reaction . . .
Maybe it is about having a conversation about it. . . asking
for help . . . It might be a way of getting her involved in a
constructive way?
J Yeah. . . Either that or just give me back me old TV please!
P: I think it taps into something we were speaking about before
the Bank holiday, about how it is hard for you to investigate
things for yourself, and ask questions yourself around your
own situation in X, and the possibility of getting resources
around accommodation other than X?
J: Yeah
P: It’s difficult for you to put that thinking in place around it
for yourself, about how you might be able to help yourself?
J: Mmm mmm.
P: Like with the TV, the initial reaction is to get angry and to
confront someone?
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J: And lose the plot
P: Yeah. . . Where there is another way of thinking about it,
which may help you, and serve your needs better.
J: Mmm mmm. Yeah, sure isn’t that just the long way around
it all though?
P: In what sense?
J: Basically I know what she is going to tell me before I even ask
her.
This extract from a session is interesting for several reasons.
Firstly, it clearly shows a move from rejecting to taking in. In
the first phase of transference, there was no space for difference
between JL and analyst, and reality could only be interpreted from
JL’s point of view. Here a more dialogic pattern can be observed,
where JL and analyst can disagree, without endangering the
therapeutic alliance. Secondly, the core conflict of the patient, his
difficulty to place himself in a position of necessity, occupies the
center of the analyst’s therapeutic efforts. In this case, however,
the conflict points at events that are taking place out of the
session, where other significant events or objects (e.g., N, one
of the ‘sisters’) are the object of transference. In this particular
situation, something important to JL is not working – something
that gives structure to a big part of his everyday routine. A new
TV has been placed in his room and it does not connect properly
with his DVD. He has tried to make it work himself, without
success. When facing this problem, he adopts a narcissistic
position (I can’t see what they can do that I can’t do) which leaves
him in a dead alley.
The whole session revolved around the efforts of the analyst
to help JL gain some insight into this dynamic; to help
him understand the mechanisms by which he gets angry and
confrontational toward N, before even asking for help. It appears
that early patterns of relating may have been transferred to N,
who is fixed on a role that has no room for novelty (Basically I
know what she is going to tell me before I even ask her). On a more
implicit level, it is possible to suggest that JL’s behavior may be
related to the certainty that his needs will not be heard, that they
are not important, and that there is no other possible outcome.
Even though JL can rationally understand, and somehow accept
the logic on the analyst’s interventions, he does not feel the story
can have a different ending. It is also interesting to note here that
the level of negative emotion experienced by JL may also have
a role in the rigid way in which he perceives reality. In the last
part of the session, he comments that when he gets angry he
‘loses the plot,’ suggesting by this that his capacity to symbolize
is compromised by negative feelings. A question that emerges
from this observation is whether there is an interaction between
negative arousal and cognitive impairment. In other words, is
it possible that in moments of negative arousal, patients with
cognitive deficits become more prone to default to primitive
forms of transference?
Full Use of the Analytic Space: “I’ve Got to Stop
Losing Things”
A third phase in the evolution of transference could be observed
toward the end of treatment. At this stage, JL appeared to have
moved away from a rigid narcissistic position. As it can be
observed in the extract below, JL was now more permeable to
the analyst’s interventions, and the therapeutic dyad could be
described as one with a reciprocal and unhindered flow of ideas
and experiences. More importantly, JL appeared more open to
the possibility of altering his internal working models, which
translates into interpretations being more completely taken in
and used, to make sense of his personal story and brain injury.
J: Now I’ve got to stop losing my glucometer.
P: You’ve lost it again?
J: (Silence 1 min). . . I was watching that program about the
Caribbean cops. Did you ever watch that?
P: No?
J: It’s about cops in the Caribbean and they have to go in and
raid places for drugs and all that. . . God you want to see this. . .
P: It’s a documentary?
J: Yeah. Its real life, about cops in the Caribbean, and they
broke into this warehouse, and the amount of grass that they
got was unreal.
P: In the Caribbean?
J: Yeah. Stag parties and all that. The amount of drink. . .
that is drunk. And they hire a boat and the boat takes them
out to sea, and everything on the boat is free once you pay
for the boat – all the alcohol is free on the boat. And the
English were drinking and drinking and falling all over the
place, falling overboard and everything. Madness it was. What
was the driver saying, three-hundred quid for the boat for the
day. Three-hundred quid between 10 of you is nothing, and as
much as you can drink a tenner a piece to go out and get pissed
and do whatever it is you want to do out there.
P: And these two pieces were on the TV last night?
J: Mmm mmm
P: About the alcohol and the marijuana?
J: Mmm mmm. Yes. . . Caribbean cops it’s called . . . You want
to see the sniffer dogs at the airport, watching people going
back. The amount of grass that is confiscated, and people
getting fined and all that going to jail and everything ludicrous.
Some guy was caught with two big suitcases full of grass trying
to get it back. . . Crazy, you know what I mean? No clothes.
No nothing else in the suitcases just grass how he expected
to get them through I don’t know. . . . . .. It was ridiculous.
Two thousand pounds he had paid, and he reckons he would
have made three hundred thousand pounds from it. . . Now
he’s serving time in a Caribbean jail.
P: . . . I’m just thinking about what comes into the session
today. The excess alcohol. . . The excessive use of alcohol, the
huge amounts of marijuana and the consequences of engaging
with that. . . The cops are involved, there is punishment, and
somebody ends up in jail. . . I am just thinking about that in
terms of your own experience of alcohol and marijuana use
and your diabetes and the subsequent brain injury?
J: Yep
P: And how that might feel the same. That you are being
punished for that.
J: Being stuck in jail.
P: Yeah. It might feel like that for you. . . And you talk about
Oscar Pistorius (earlier discussion in session). Does he get off?
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Does he get a reprieve? It’s very like the situation you are in at
the moment. Are you going to get out of Bellevue? Will you get
off?
J: Mmmm mmmm
P: It’s very much on your mind, these things about the past, and
where it has led to, and where you are now and how will you
get out of it.
J: That’s true.
P: In a couple of different senses. The physical sense of being
in Bellevue, but also the psychological sense of your mind and
the damage to your memory.
J: How do you mean?
P: Will it recover? Will you recover? Will it improve? Will it
change?
J: Well I’ve been told there is a great improvement, but I can’t
see it because I am living with it day in and day out.
P: So someone told you there was an improvement?
J: Oh yeah
P: This was the neurological tests you had recently?
J: Oh yeah. . . I can’t see any improvement I didn’t see anything
wrong with me in the first place. So I didn’t know any better.
P: Ok. . . so what to do you think now? What’s your sense of
how things are now?
J: How do you mean?
P: Memory wise
J: I think now my memory is a lot better that it used to be.
Mmm mmmm. Now I can remember people’s names, and put
people’s names to a face, and all that sort of craic.2 Because
beforehand I couldn’t’ do that.
P: So it has improved, in that sense and somebody tells
you, the psychologist who ran the tests, tells you there is an
improvement, and it is hard for you to take it in.
J: I couldn’t see it, no.
P: And at the same time you are aware of your memory being
better than it used to be?
J: Oh yeah. When I look back on things, I can remember now,
and I see I am a lot better than I used to be.
P: And what is that like?
J: I don’t know. . . To think back about how I used to be. . . I
don’t know. . . I don’t want to go back there. . . put it that way.
P: Ok.
J: (Laughs) Now if I could only remember where I’d put my
glucometer I would be a happy person. For the life of me I
couldn’t find it can’t find it anywhere.
This vignette is a good example of the ease of movement
between analyst and JL during the last part of the therapy process.
In general, JL appears less defended, which translates into a more
proactive and productive chain of associations. JL is not afraid
to bring things up, and is less likely to reject the possibility
of exploring the different perspectives offered by the analyst.
Another way of thinking about this is that JL’s capacity to tolerate
what the analyst has to say has developed, to a point where he can
hold new perspectives in his mind and use it to symbolize new
possible meanings.
2Craic – colloquial Irish term for fun, however, in this instance it can be understood
as “all that sort of thing.”
Another interesting element, during this last phase is the
more open elaboration of conflicts, particularly the ones around
his loss of independence. This can be observed in the analyst’s
effort to link JL’s associations (drug abuse, sentence, jail) to his
personal history. It is interesting that JL does not immediately
reject this avenue of exploration, but accepts it as a possible
interpretation. This shift is particularly important in that it
allowed the progressive elaboration of feelings that were, initially,
difficult to tolerate (anger and guilt for not taking care of this
health) and needed to be directed to others (e.g., anger toward
the sisters). A possible consequence of such shift may well be
JL’s disposition to talk more openly about his memory difficulties,
which can be considered an acknowledgment of their existence.
This picture differs quite importantly from the initial phase of
treatment, where very rigid and primitive defense mechanisms
were needed to avoid contact with this painful reality.
Countertransference: One or Many?
Countertransference is a long-standing theoretical and technical
concept in psychoanalysis (for a review, see Thomä and Kächele,
2010). However, its consideration when working with brain
injured patients is quite rare (Pepping, 1993; Lewis, 1999; Kaplan-
Solms and Solms, 2000; Salas, 2008; Yeates, 2009; Klonoff, 2010;
Salas et al., 2013; Tiberg, 2014). Lewis (1999), using ideas from
Racker (1960, 1968), has offered perhaps the most comprehensive
review on the topic, suggesting four possible configurations:
(a) complementary (to feel what the patient’s significant others
have felt in the past in response to the patient’s behavior); (b)
concordant (to feel what the patient is feeling, or what the patient
is struggling not to feel); (c) idealizing (to feel admired by the
patient or seen as an omnipotent figure); and (d) mirroring (to
feel the need to accept and confirm the patient’s Self, to become
an extension of the patient’s Self).
Most of the countertransferential feelings experienced by JL’s
analyst can be readily described as examples of the configurations
proposed by Lewis (1999). For example, during the episode
of the Liffey bridges, the analyst’s countertransference can be
considered as complementary, as he became captured by feelings
(e.g., confusion and worthlessness) that JL apparently could not
tolerate. Similarly, the analyst reported occasional strange bodily
sensations, which took the form of a dizzying semi-nauseous
feeling, tinged with confusion. This strangely visceral and somatic
feeling was at times subtle, and at other times pronounced.
However, it was virtually always present at a background level
during the sessions. The nauseous or dizzy feeling was eventually
understood by the analyst as a possible somatic correlate of a
‘hypo-glycemic’ event, which JL feared and talked about regularly
during sessions. On other occasions, the analyst experienced
countertransferential feelings that were complementary to the
patient’s own mental states. For example, during the Liffey
bridges incident the analyst felt stupid and incompetent, a
common experience for all those caring for JL (e.g., sisters).
This type of countertransferential feeling appeared to be linked
also to the analyst’s own insecurities about his ability to deliver
psychotherapy to such a complex patient.
Lewis (1999) also comments that, besides the classic
countertransference configurations observed when working with
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brain injured patients, the analyst may experience feelings in
response to his/her perception of the patient’s deficits, and the
patient’s reaction to his own deficits. The case of JL is interesting
in this respect, in that it suggests that the patient’s deficits
themselves (not its perception or reaction to them) can also
influence the analyst’s mental states. This phenomenon has been
referred before as ‘organic’ countertransference (Salas et al.,
2013), and appears to be produced by the neuropsychological
attunement between analyst and patient. From a Kohutian
point of view, this can be considered as a form of merging
countertransference, where the analyst becomes an extension
of the patient’s self (Kohut, 1971). JL’s analyst experienced
several episodes where this type of countertransference appears
to be in action. Changes in the analyst’s memory functioning
is perhaps the most common example, with forgetting names,
words or places as a recurrent phenomenon. The analyst
describes (in his notes) that during the sessions it was rather
common to find himself and JL unsuccessfully searching for the
name of a soccer player, sporting event, movie or actor. From
the analyst’s perspective, these memory gaps were impossible
to address during the session itself, but became far more
accessible the further away in time and space the analyst
became from the session. It is also interesting to note that
these memory ‘slips’ did not only occur during the analytic
sessions, but also around them, in logistical and practical
dealings with the institution that took care of JL, or with the
residential unit at which JL lived. Events, appointments and
notifications between institutions were often dropped, missed
or confused. This appears to be the first time that such
memory findings have been formally reported in working with
amnesia, but we suspect that the may well be common (but
underreported).
END OF TREATMENT
As it was noted in the Section “Introduction,” one of the main
limitations of previous studies exploring how patients with
profound amnesia present during psychoanalytic treatment has
been their short duration. In the case of the study by Turnbull
et al. (2006), for example, the patient was seen only eight sessions,
thus only allowing observing the emergence of transferential
feelings, but not considering the course of such feelings during
treatment or their elaboration at the end of treatment. The case of
JL is unique in this sense, by offering for the first time evidence
regarding the impact of profound amnesia in the dynamics of the
termination stage.
The most important observation regarding the ending of
psychotherapy is the presence of a similar amnesic pattern
to that witnessed at the beginning, and also during the
course of treatment. This pattern was characterized by
the absence of ‘explicit’ recall of the fact that treatment
was ending, apparently together with a level of ‘implicit’
and emotional awareness of the situation (see below for
examples). It is interesting to note also that this pattern
influenced the analyst’s countertransference during this stage,
particularly in relation to his own experience of separation
and mourning. The description of these phenomena, and its
theoretical and technical implications will be addressed in this
section.
Are We Ending? A Dissociation between
Explicit and Implicit Awareness of
Termination
The amnesic pattern presented by JL along the course of
treatment involved an absence of explicit recall that the
treatment was ending together with, an implicit awareness
of the impending separation and loss. The lack of explicit
recollection can be appreciated in two ways. Firstly, during
the last period of treatment, JL was always surprised when
the analyst brought his attention to the fact that therapy
was ending. Secondly, JL never enquired the analyst, at least
spontaneously, regarding termination. The following vignette
from the penultimate session offers an example of how this
phenomenon was observed during the termination phase. In
addition, it also illustrates how JL’s difficulty to stay on topic,
without ‘dropping it,’ impacted the elaboration of feelings related
to termination:
P: And have you thought about the sessions ending in here?
J: When are they ending?
P: Next week is our last session.
J: Is it?
P: Yes. (silence 1 min)
P: What are your thoughts about finishing up?
J: I don’t know. . .what am I going to do on a Monday
afternoon now? How long have I been coming here? Just over
a year? A year and a half?
P: It has been 2 years.
J: Two? (silence 2 min) (there is a squeaky sound coming from
outside). . . we need some WD40. What is it?
P: I have no idea.
J: So, have you been to the cinema lately?
P: No I haven’t.
Most of the sessions during the termination phase began in
the same way, with JL arriving to them oblivious to the fact
that the treatment was ending. The analyst writes about this
phenomenon in his notes: Each session involved me repeating
the same question about the ending arriving and enquiring
about J’s thoughts on this. Each time the reply was the same;
as if it were the first time to hear about this.’ Even though JL
appeared unable to consolidate information about the impending
termination, it is extremely interesting that his associations
during the last sessions were often related to issues of death
or loss of objects. Consider, for example, the following extract
from one of the last sessions, where JL comments on his
lost glucometer pack, where he kept important cards and
documents. The loss of these, and how to replace them, figured
frequently in the sessions leading up to the final of treatment.
JL was pre-occupied with its whereabouts and retracing his
recent movements with the glucometer was a common line of
associations:
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J: You know your Personal Public Service Card?3. . .Who do
you get them off?
P: Revenue Office, I think?
J: Do you have to fill out a form or something?
P: I would say so.
J: Because I’ve lost mine.
P: It is with your glucometer, is it?
J: Yes
P: Have you said it to anybody? To your key worker? To
M or C?
J: You see I don’t know where I lost it . . . You see it wouldn’t
be here, if it was it would be in my lunch bag, and my lunch
back is back in Bellevue hospital.
P: Have you asked at reception?
J: Here? Oh no. It’s not here, I know that.
P: Oh, you know that. . . You have mentioned that you were in
B___, and that you were playing snooker recently.
J: No, I don’t take my machine with me.
P: Oh you don’t take it with you? (silence 1 min).
JL’s associations during the last stage were not exclusively
related to the loss of concrete objects, but also included thoughts
and memories associated with death and loss. For example, JL
occupied considerable time talking about a resident who had
recently passed away, and whom JL had known since he was
hospitalized after the brain injury. Memories from childhood,
also related to loss and its elaboration, emerged during the last
sessions. A particular one is interesting, since it evokes Freudian
ideas (Freud, 1950) on separation (fort-da):
J: . . . I used to kick the ball out over the cliffs, and the ball
would come straight back to you. I never lost a ball over the cliffs
. . . Ahh yeah everybody used to walk down the cliffs from the
cottage we were staying in. . . I always wanted to run and jump
off, to get pushed back by the wind, but I was never allowed to. It
always amazed me you could kick a ball as hard as you could out
over the sea and it would just come floating back. . . They parasail
off it now, they go parasailing off there.
The theme of succession also featured as part of JL’s
associations during the last sessions, with an emphasis on what
will happen to him after the ending, and who will occupy the
analyst’s place. The analyst picked up on the potential meaning
of these associations, and offered them to JL, as material to reflect
about the ending of treatment.
J: What do you make of Nelson Mandela?
P: He’s not very well at the moment is he?
J: No, I’d say he’ll kick it before the Queen of England does.
P: He’s critical at the moment. He went back in to hospital
yesterday.
J: Did he? I’d say it’s a bet between himself and the Queen who’s
going to die first. I know who Charlie has his money on. He
would be saying “come on hurry up” . . . I can’t imagine King
Charles being anything or doing anything. King Harry, Now
he’s the one I would like to see in power. I reckon he should
knock his brother off.
3A unique reference number that helps patients access social welfare benefits,
public services and information.
P: He’s next in line is he?
J: He’s third in line. It’s Charles, then his brother, then him.
P: Ok
J: Yeah, he’s the youngest of the boys. Christ! Imagine the
country if he got into power. Have you ever seen him on the
TV programs?
P: King Harry or Prince Harry?
J: Prince Harry. He’s a wild kid. Always giving the secret service
or whoever looks after him the skip. He goes to night clubs
and everything. Yeah, sure, he went off to join the marines and
went to Germany and all that. So what happens when Charles
dies? Camilla wouldn’t’ become Queen?. . . his wife?
P: I don’t know.
J: It must be the eldest son or the eldest daughter in their family,
so Charles must be the eldest of the queen’s children and Philip
is his eldest. . . (silence, 1 min) Are you watching any of the
athletics that’s on TV at the moment?. . .
P: I am just thinking, this idea about succession that is on your
mind. About the King and who succeeds him and so on and so
on. . . and I am just thinking about that in the context of what
is happening here in the therapy today. It’s the last session and
maybe that is on your mind what will. . .
J: Follow on from it.
P: Follow on what, or who will be the successor of the therapy?
J: Mmmm. . . That’s true.
P: I think that you may not have remembered that today was
the last day of the therapy. I’m not sure had you remembered.
J: No
P: But I think that in some part of your mind it was registered
and it came in here (silence, 1 min). I am just wondering what
is it like for you?
J: I’m just thinking, what I am going to do on a Monday
afternoon? Play bingo?
P: . . .. What are your thoughts about finishing?
J: I don’t know. I am going to miss you. . . I have got to get your
address to post you on that picture (a painting of the forest that
J has been working on), (laughs). Now don’t expect it yet for the
next couple of years but I’ll post it on.
Am I the Only One Mourning Here? The
Impact of Amnesia on the Analyst’s
Countertransference during Termination
It has long been noted –based on the observation of
neurologically healthy individuals– that the elaboration of
countertransferential feelings during the end of treatment
is a particularly difficult challenge for analysts (Schlesinger,
2014). However, an interesting question that remains to be
addressed is whether brain damage adds further complexity to
such elaboration. Notably, whether cognitive impairment may
impact the mind of the analyst, and generate quite unusual
countertransferential feelings. As noted above, this type of
response has been referred to as ‘organic countertransference’
(Salas et al., 2013), since its source is not the patient’s conflicts,
but the particular way in which the mind of the patient
functions after the injury. Analysts that work with individuals
that have acquired a brain injury often struggle to disentangle
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whether their countertransferential feelings are a response to
patients’ cognitive deficits or conflicts. The case of JL offers
some tentative answers on this matter, suggesting ways in
which, during termination, countertransference is fed by both
the impact of neuropsychological deficits and the influence
of patient’s dynamics. Here, we briefly address this problem,
describing the analyst’s countertransferential experience during
termination, and his difficulties in using such experiences as a
source of information upon which to decide how to proceed
analytically.
What is the impact of profound amnesia on the
countertransferential feelings generated during the termination
stage? How does the patient’s total lack of recollection regarding
the ending of treatment impact on the analyst’s feelings and
interventions? In the case of JL’s analyst, this was a constant
dilemma during the last phase of treatment. The analyst
comment about this in his notes: ‘Ought the analyst to deviate
from the usual patient-led flow of the session, when the ending was
imminent, but there was no indication of JL having remembered
this? Or is there an obligation on the analyst to remember this for
the patient and bring it into the session? After another session the
analyst comments: ‘20 min into the session and with no explicit
reference to the imminent ending of the therapy, the push and pull
to act within me became too great to bear. This was a push and
pull between the idea of whether or not to move out of position,
and bring up the subject of the ending of the therapy, or to sit with
the material that was coming and try to analyze it.
To the analyst this dilemma was not simply a technical
decision that needed to be made, regarding whether or not
remind JL about the ending, but also implied becoming aware
of strong feelings that gradually emerged along sessions: ‘An
increasing sense of obligation rose within me, a sense of obligation
to JL, to do something for him that he was unable to do, perform
the function of remembering for him. It felt strange, as I had
performed that function for him in many ways over our 2 years
of working together. This felt different. It was very difficult for
me to remind him of our time together coming to an end. I
had of course done this several times already in previous sessions
leading up to the ending, however, I noted an increasing sense of
disappointment and frustration growing in me the closer we came
to the ending. I understand this as being the gradual realization
that JL could not cognitively remember the fact that the therapy was
coming to an end. Along with the disappointment and frustration
I felt, I also experienced a terrible sense of powerlessness and
despair. After another session, the analyst keeps writing on this
topic: ‘eventually over time an ever increasing sense of sadness,
annoyance and frustration grew in me. In the final sessions I
noted what seemed like a hardening or intolerance, toward what
J had to say, being present in me. I was becoming angry with J
for not remembering. Later I came to understand this in several
ways. One is the genuine sadness, annoyance and frustration in
me about having to end the sessions due to lack of funding and
the unsustainability of the therapy from the perspective of time
and financial commitment. Another is that ending in this way is
contrary to my usual practice, where I clearly state with patients
that ending therapy is their prerogative, so the enforced nature of
this ending was very uncomfortable for me. There is also my loss in
the ending of these sessions for the relationship that had developed
between J and me. I was going to miss him.
It is interesting to reflect here on the emotions that the analyst
is experiencing, as well as the possible sources of his grief. He
comments that disappointment, despair and anger come in large
part because of the realization that JL will not remember the
end of treatment. However, he also links feelings of sadness and
frustration (and perhaps guilt) to the unilateral way in which
the treatment was terminating. A complementary interpretation
is that his frustration and disappointment could be related to
the realization that JL may not remember him. That once they
separate, he will no longer have a place in JL’s mind. He will be –
perhaps completely – forgotten, as happens with any new event
or any new bit of information. This is perhaps also an important
source of grief: JL will forget the analyst, as with everything else.
Most analysts mourn their patients, helped by the conviction
that, in some way, aspects of themselves will be preserved –
or incorporated– by patients after treatment is ended. This is
perhaps a similar feeling to the one parents experience with their
children. It does not matter whether we die, something will pass
on in them. Thus, the inability to consolidate new memories
in amnesic patients may trigger in the analyst strong anxieties
regarding separation, which may complicate the elaboration of
the mourning process that separation entails.
THE STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF
THE THERAPEUTIC PROCESS
An important issue that needs to be considered, when working
psychoanalytically with brain injured individuals, is the impact
that a specific profile of cognitive impairment may have on
the structure and dynamics of the therapeutic process (e.g.,
Salas et al., 2013). If we consider the Generic Model of
Psychotherapy (Orlinsky, 2009), the structure and dynamics
of the psychotherapeutic process can be described as a set
of interrelated dimensions: therapeutic contract, therapeutic
operations, therapeutic bond, Self-relatedness and in-session
impacts. It has been noted by Orlinsky that these five therapeutic
dimensions acquire different configurations –temporal patterns–
as the process changes over time – perhaps, as micro-events
within therapy sessions, or as macro-events over the course of
the treatment. The most important observation in the case of
JL appears to be the disruption of these temporal patterns,
compromising the continuity of micro-events (intra-session)
and macro-events (inter-session). More simply put, profound
amnesia impairs the individual’s ability to experience each
analytic session as one temporal unit, and also compromises
the patient’s capacity to connect elements that belong to distant
moments in the therapeutic process.
Intra-Session Temporal Discontinuity
Early on during the treatment the analyst noted an intriguing
feature in his interaction with JL. Every session, after a couple
of minutes, there was a sudden disruption, where JL stopped
talking and appeared to withdraw from the conversation. This
disruption was often followed by a pause that could last from a
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few seconds to a couple of minutes, where JL stayed silent. Then,
JL appeared to re-initiate the conversation, without resuming the
previously discussed topic, but returning to associations related
to his past life, or to topics that were a shared interest with
the analyst (typically sports). In the analyst’s notes, these events
were described as a ‘memory reset’ and ‘dropping contents.’
Both images appear to portray the analyst’s experience that
something had occurred in JL’s mind, something related to
his memory impairment, which forced his mind –and also
the interaction– to ‘reboot.’ Both metaphors –the ‘reset’ and
the ‘dropping’– point to a process that is abruptly disrupted,
and appears to re-start from zero. It is important to note
that this ‘dropping’ of subjects occurred largely on an explicit
level, since there were times where an underlying continuity
in the apparently unconnected associations that emerged after
the reset might be observed –or has at least suggested or
intuited.
Regardless of this issue, memory reset posed important
challenges to the analyst’s technique. Firstly, the intra-
session temporal continuity was regularly disrupted, so that
interventions based on linking contents from different moments
inside the session appeared to be compromised. Secondly,
interpersonal attunement was also interrupted, since the analyst’s
following of the patient’s chain of associations came to an abrupt
halt, causing counter-transferential feelings of confusion and
perplexity at the beginning, and frustration later. An important
central challenge for the analyst in the management of these
events was to determine whether they represented a defensive
maneuver that occurred when in contact with emotionally
difficult contents, or whether they were the consequence of JL’s
inability to consolidate new memories.
The process by which the analytic dyad re-engaged after
the memory ‘resets’ is also of technical and theoretical interest.
After the ‘pauses,’ JL often addressed the analyst with questions
related to shared interests. It was not unusual, for example,
for JL to ask the analyst three or four times throughout
the session: “Did you watch any sport over the weekend?”
or “Have you seen any good movies lately?” As can be
expected, when these questions are formulated by JL, he has no
recollection about asking the same question before, or whether
they have been answered or not. The analytic notes reflect
on this mechanism: “These shared themes are places of refuge
during difficult periods in the sessions. After his memory has
reset, these facts are used to anchor or ground JL Memories
about mutual interests are presented like islands in the sea of
uncertainty that constitutes the majority of the sessions. They
form a safe ground after being shipwrecked by the failure of
memory.”
Notably, these ‘restarting’ topics are far from random, and
have clear interpersonal benefits for the relationship with
the analyst. Thus the repetition of these questions might be
considered as a regulatory mechanism. From an intrapersonal
point of view, they offer mental contents that can be used to re-
start the dyad-system, thus bringing some sense of direction and
certainty. From an interpersonal point of view, these contents
have also a regulatory role, since they facilitate the re-attunement
of patient and analyst. They are safe areas, for JL knows that these
topics are dear to the analyst as well, who is keen to re-connect
with him, through them.
Inter-Session Temporal Discontinuity:
There Is Novelty in Repetition
Profound amnesia not only compromises individual’s capacity to
experience the analytic session as a unit, but also the generation
of links between sessions, or what Orlinsky (2009) calls macro-
events. The implications of this impairment for psychoanalytic
technique are not minor, since meaning is often generated
through the elaboration of elements from different sessions, and
also through the elaboration of material related to the real life
that occurs in between sessions. This capacity was markedly
impaired in JL, who rarely connected the material discussed
during one session with previous conversations, or with events
that occurred outside therapy. This deficit is interesting in the
light of a growing literature suggesting that individuals with
profound amnesia experience important difficulties in moving
backward and forward in time (e.g., Klein et al., 2002; Hassabis
et al., 2007), a psychological process commonly known as mental
‘time travel’ (Suddendorf and Corballis, 1997; Suddendorf, 2013).
It is possible that such time travel is a key psychological ability for
the capacity to link elements from disparate moments in time,
important when elaborating meaning during a psychotherapeutic
process.
It is interesting to note that JL’s difficulty in linking material
between sessions was not complete. During the treatment there
were a small number of occasions where he did spontaneously
bring material into sessions that had been previously discussed.
A distinctive feature of these very rare episodes was that the
material remembered by JL, and actively brought to session, had
strong emotional content. The best example here is the episode of
the bridges over the river Liffey, where JL brought the topic back
to session four times. This observation is relevant for two reasons.
Firstly, it supports the idea that neuropsychological deficits are
not static, for they can be modulated by contextual elements
(Bowen et al., 2010), in this case by the level of emotional
salience. Secondly, because it suggests that mental time travel,
or the capacity to move backward and forward in time, is a
cognitive process mediated by important non-cognitive factors
(D’Argembeau and Van der Linden, 2006).
JL’s temporal discontinuity between sessions posed important
challenges to the analyst’s technique, forcing some adjustments.
Perhaps the most important was a change in the analyst’s focus
of attention: from the explicit contents brought by JL, which
were often scarce and repetitive, to the implicit connections that
underlie such contents. This shift allowed the analyst to spot
the recurrence of emerging themes that appeared related to JL’s
conflicts. Of particular interest here was the reconsideration of
the therapeutic value of contents that JL repeatedly brought
to session. For example, two very common repetitive topics
brought spontaneously by JL were sports and cinema – described
above as a way of re-booting the conversation. At first, the
analyst considered this repetitive event as some form of mental
perseveration. However, when carefully considered, repetitions
were never the same, or they never ended in the same thread
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of associations. In other words, there was always novelty on JL’s
repetitions. Despite starting from similar associative points, they
tended to follow an independent course, perhaps fuelled by the
dynamic nature of internal states. During most of the process, the
work of the analyst (as it is in any analytic setting) was to listen
carefully and patiently to these repetitions, and to verbalize their
potential meaning to JL This often led to insight and awareness,
for JL and the analyst in the moment, and the opening up of space
for the introduction of new material for consideration.
SOME BRIEF OBSERVATIONS ON THE
GENERATION OF NEW MEMORIES
DURING THE PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC
PROCESS
As discussed above (see Introduction), there is a growing
literature suggesting that individuals with profound amnesia
remain able to learn several types of new information, including
forms of emotional learning. The observation of a long
term psychotherapeutic process offers a unique opportunity
to investigate the independence of emotional learning, for it
involves the development of a new interpersonal relationship,
where both new semantic and emotional information (both
complex and sometimes contradictory) has to be learnt. Even
though the generation of new memories during the treatment is
not the main focus of this paper, we believe that it deserves brief
mention.
The first notable issue is that, despite his dense anterograde
amnesia, JL appears to preserve some capacity to lay down
new memories, particularly if they have an emotional nature.
We have mentioned before the episode of the bridges over the
river Liffey, but there are other examples. For example, there
was a large photograph of a wooded copse (see Figure 1) on
the consulting room wall, which became the source of many
associative chains during the course of the treatment. To JL,
this picture evoked feelings of safety, freedom, happiness and
independence. It also reminded him of a location close to his
original home, which he visited regularly before the brain injury.
With time, this picture became quite meaningful, and JL decided
to start painting it between sessions, as part of his weekly art
class. To the analyst, this picture reflected some aspects of the
therapeutic relationship, which JL was able to take with him,
despite his inability to explicitly remember the events from the
sessions. This clinical observation is interesting, in that it points
to the possibility of using concrete objects to help individuals
with profound amnesia in connecting to self-states that cannot be
accessed via mental representations. This idea has been developed
before, by Prigatano (1999), in relation to the use of drawings
and paintings to help individuals with traumatic brain injury in
symbolizing and elaborating their subjective experience.
There are other examples that support the idea that
profoundly amnesic patients can generate new memories. For
example, after 10 sessions, JL remembered the analyst’s name, and
then used it consistently during each session, with no need of
prompting. It appears that elements of the physical setting, where
the sessions occurred, were also incorporated as new memories.
On one occasion, due to the reorganization of the building, the
consulting room had undergone some changes, with fixtures and
fittings replaced. A large, distinctively patterned, and colorful
rug, which JL would regularly contemplate during sessions, was
replaced with a much smaller and more plain rug. JL noted this
change almost immediately, and said: “There’s something not quite
right here, something is different about the room, I can’t quite put
my finger on it.” Unexpected separations from the analyst were
also remembered by JL. For example, one session was canceled by
the analyst at short notice, due to illness. In the following session,
in the middle of a silence, and quite out of the blue, JL angrily
confronted the analyst:
JL: So, what happened to you last week?
PM: I was sick. . . did you get my message?
JL: Yes
PM: What is it like not having the session last week?
JL: I don’t know I don’t know how I felt.
PM: You missed it?
JL: Yes, I did.
Given JL’s profound amnesia, it was truly surprising that
he retained the absence of the analyst for an entire week. It
is possible that the encoding of such an event was fuelled
by strong negative emotions, perhaps linked to his history of
traumatic separations. However, these observations also highlight
the danger of considering memory deficits in amnesic patients
as fixed, thus underestimating their capacity to be emotionally
affected by interpersonal events. There is some evidence
suggesting that individuals with amnestic syndromes (including
dementia) preserve an ability to remember relationships (Evans-
Roberts and Turnbull, 2011). The case of JL offers a novel class
of evidence on the impact of interpersonal emotional rupture on
memory encoding.
DISCUSSION
Patients with profound amnesia have been studied for decades.
However, most of the existing evidence regarding the impact
of amnesia in mental life comes from neuropsychological
assessments or experimental tasks. It has been suggested by
some authors that the observations of neurological patients
using the analytic method can offer valuable insight into
changes in emotion, motivation, and personality (Kaplan-Solms
and Solms, 2000; Turnbull and Solms, 2004). This article
has followed such tradition, and is the first to present data
from a long term psychoanalytic process (72 sessions across
2 years) of an individual with profound amnesia after an
anoxic episode. In relation to the aims of this paper, two main
questions were explored: What is the impact of amnesia on
transference and countertransference phenomena? And which
technical and therapeutic modifications are required to work
psychoanalytically with such amnesic individuals?
In relation to the first question, this study reported intense
transference and countertransference phenomena throughout
the therapeutic process, which evolved as the treatment
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FIGURE 1 | The picture of the wooden copse.
progressed. Both transference and countertransference were
importantly influenced by the amnesic deficits and by the
premorbid narcissistic personality of the patient, which at times
presented a sadistic quality. This combination of organic and
personality elements required the implementation of important
modifications to the analytic technique, such as holding the
function of remembering for JL, bringing temporal continuity
between and within sessions, and considering multiple levels
of trauma when formulating interventions. These include
premorbid trauma related to JL’s personal history, trauma
associated with acquiring a brain injury, and present-day trauma
associated with adjusting to life after a brain injury. Modifications
to technique were also necessary at the termination phase of the
treatment, in consideration of JL’s inability to remember that the
treatment was coming to an end.
This case study also offers novel evidence on the
neuropsychological basis of memory, particularly in relation to
the dissociation of explicit and implicit memory systems. The
development of a personal relationship between the analyst
and JL, is consistent with data from previous studies suggesting
that individuals with profound amnesia are not only able to
experience emotions (Feinstein et al., 2010; Damasio et al., 2012),
but also are capable of learning about the emotional valence of
interpersonal relationships (Claparede, 1911/1951; Tranel and
Damasio, 1990, 1993). During the course of the therapy, it was
possible to observe not only how emotional valence was attached
to the analyst, but also how this emotional learning process
changed dynamically with the evolution of the transference.
This, despite a marked difficulty in retaining and learning new
information about the analyst. Nevertheless, data from this case
also suggests that the inability to encode new information was
not complete, since certain themes were spontaneously brought
to therapy by JL on repeated occasions. These observations
suggest that the generation of new memories in patients like JL is
possible, but appears to be highly mediated by emotional factors.
To our knowledge, this is the first case study that allows us to
observe the development –and learning– of a new interpersonal
relationship of this type in a patient with profound amnesia.
Our findings are of interest too for the psychoanalytic
community, particularly in relation to how psychic change can
take place despite a severe impairment in explicit memory,
thus supporting the claims of authors who have suggested
implicit memory as a core process involved in therapeutic change
(see Introduction). More importantly, it confirms the relevance
of implicit, or perhaps more correctly, affect-based memory
systems, to transferential phenomena. Thus, this study extends
the work of Turnbull et al. (2006), who offered preliminary
evidence suggesting the preservation of transference phenomena
in individuals with profound amnesia. However, our data is
novel in that it demonstrates for the first time that transferential
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feelings in this population not only unfold, but also develop and
change across the therapeutic process. This study is also novel
in that it offers for the first time a description of the main
features of countertransferential phenomenon when working
with profoundly amnesic patients, as well as showing such
information can be used to adapt the psychoanalytic tools and
setting.
From a technical point of view, it is interesting to note
that classic psychodynamic processes, such as hate, sadism, and
narcissism, were not only observed but also addressed in the
transference–countertransference phenomena. This appears to
support the value of considering a relational framework with this
population, particularly as regards the use of models that include
the transition between part-object and whole-object forms of
mental functioning.
This study has several limitations. It focuses on only one
amnesic patient, with a very particular premorbid personality
structure. The development of a series of cases of patients with
profound amnesia would be welcomed, since it would make
it possible to explore commonalities that emerge beyond the
idiosyncrasies of each case. Such an approach would also contrast
the influence of different analysts (including their personalities
and therapeutic style), on the process. Other issues related to the
setting also demand attention. It would be interesting to know
whether a therapy with a higher frequency of sessions would
facilitate even further the consolidation of information, or the
elaboration of emotional conflicts. Similarly, since the end of this
process was imposed by the analyst due to financial and logistical
constraints, it would be useful to explore whether an open-ended
treatment would change the dynamics of the ending phase.
This appears to be the first ever report of this nature with
an amnesic patient. The investigation therefore has important
theoretical implications for psychoanalytic practice, and for
psychotherapy in general, and not only with regard to brain
injured populations. Importantly, it raises questions concerning
the mechanism of therapeutic action in psychotherapy, which has
often been understood to require episodic memory. Clearly, in
these instances the agent of change is not that described in many
contemporary cognitive or cognitive behavioral models. Rather,
change appears to be driven primarily from the affective level,
and more specifically through the emotion-related components
present in the analyst–patient relationship, or in the emotional
field of the transference. As the transference develops, takes form
and intensifies, there appears to be a correlational development
and strengthening of ego function, manifested by an increased
capacity to understand and tolerate loss, improved reality testing,
and (arguably) improvement in depressive symptoms. Clearly,
this is only an early attempt to investigate key questions – using
a novel approach and emerging tools. However, we believe that it
represents an interesting and important way of studying central
issues in the mechanism of psychotherapy, and its neuroscientific
basis.
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